EPISTEMOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS UNDERLYING A FOURTH MAIN THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE IN SOCIOLOGY

Dr. Tom Arcaro, Professor of Sociology, Elon University, Elon, NC 27244

Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association in Chicago, Il, August 6-10, 1999.

Reflexive Statement

A few years ago I was able to teach an upper division class here at Elon College in which I used Erich Fromm's The Sane Society. I have always been impressed by Fromm's neo-Freudian/Marxian approach, but more so by the very premise of this book, namely that we may not be a sane society and that the social structure in which we live may not be the most healthy. It was this class and his work that lead me to my current working definition of humanism which is, in all its long winded glory: Humanism is an ideology of human growth and potential which begins with the assumption that we should all work toward creating a global social structure which will not only allow for but actively encourage the reaching of all potentials (intellectual, physical and spiritual) by every human, and that this should be done in harmonious cooperation with all other life on the planet.

In doing reading and research for this class I chanced upon a cover article in TIME Magazine by the evolutionary psychologist Robert Wright. The gist of this article was that the Unibomber was right in pointing out that we were not designed to live under the present environmental and social conditions and that many personal and societal problems can be linked to the fact that a being which was designed 100,000 years ago in the savannas of Africa was now living in urban complexity. The essay below is an outcome of the reading I have done since that first Wright article. I am excited by this new (at least for me) paradigm and have become an evolutionary biology junkie of late. I am convinced that the initial negative reaction to E.O. Wilson's 1976 publication of Sociobiology is finally beginning to subside and that the scope and power of this perspective will now become more actively employed in the search for the ways to create a more just planet.

Introduction and framework

What I present here --at least in my mind-- is no less than an argument in support of a fourth main theoretical perspective in sociology, or, more accurately and broadly, in the social sciences. Like the three other main perspectives which are used in various forms by many sociologists (namely, structural-functionalism, conflict theory and symbolic interactionism), this new perspective comes with its own set of epistemological assumptions. The purpose of this paper is to discuss these assumptions and illustrate how they relate to some of the ideas and theories of classical sociological theorists and philosophers.

I will not go so far as to argue for a dogmatic sociobiological perspective and say, for example, that, to paraphrase Theodosius Dobzhansky, "Nothing in society makes sense except in the light of evolution." But I do adopt what can accurately be described as a neo-Darwinian paradigm. Just as the principles of evolution by natural selection are finally beginning to inform such fields as medicine, psychiatry and psychology, I argue that these same principles can and perhaps must inform the future of sociology.

The "big three" perspectives mentioned above will find surprising support from this new paradigm, but this support will only be touched upon in the present work.

At this point in my conceptualization I do not have the vocabulary to explain myself thoroughly as to the deep philosophical underpinnings of this perspective, but what I do understand is that this framework demands a strict adherence to ontological monism. It is beyond my ability to put into words all the important differences between ontological pluralism --which I believe is assumed, for example, by the symbolic interactionists and functionalists-- and ontological monism. Suffice to say that the monistic approach seems to make more sense and, after all is said and done, is more liberating conceptually. (Once again the rule of Occam's Razor is invoked, i.e., the simpler model of explanation wins out over the more complex.)

Finally, this essay does not lay out my conception of the contribution a neo-Darwinian sociobiological perspective can make to sociology in general, that effort will be a future work. Below I will, however, make mention of how the epistemological underpinnings of this perspective afford some interesting revised looks at some traditional humanistic sociology issues.

The task of the humanistic sociologist is to describe and analyze the social construction of ways of knowing, determined both biogenetically and through social learning/construction.

A general overview of epistemology would uncover:

1.  Materialism is the view that reality is mirrored in the brain; reality is the same for everyone, external to the individual. This is the epistemology of positivism and structural-functionalism.

2.  Idealism appears next and is more complex than materialism. The idealists assumption is that although reality enters the brain the same to everyone, sense is made of it, i.e., the data are processed and manipulated after entering, and reality is constructed rather than simply mirrored. Interpretations and data differ by culture and even idiosyncratically by individuals. This is the epistemology of symbolic interactionism

3.  Biogenetic structuralism is the most recent epistemology and, in its most general statement, assumes that although all sense data may begin the process of entering the brain, there are a variety of "filters" or transforms which prioritize and even selectively destroy data before it is processed by the brain. Now the assumption of the idealist takes over and "sense" is made of reality at this point.

The "input:" more detail on biogenetic structuralism

In discussing this epistemology it will be useful to discuss not only how the individual makes sense of data which comes from the outside world or "input," but also how these same transforms and structures impact and determine the nature of the "output" of the individual, how they communicate to and relate to the external social world. In this section I will relate these new ideas to those of classic social philosophers. Much of this section is admittedly highly speculative.

The biogenetic structures are both innate/hardwired and learned. First I will discuss those which are "hardwired."

One very simple way to talk about structuralism in general which would include both "input" and "output" is to use the analogy with the difference between regular and polarized sunglasses. With cheap sunglasses the mechanism by which the light is diminished is just a gross darkening of the lens allowing for less light of all wave structures to come through. Polarized lenses work on a dramatically different principle, literally "polarizing" the light which is let through. Only light that is waving on the preferred plane is let through (hence these lenses are able to cut down glare, etc.) In the brain there are at least two kinds of "polarizing" mechanisms, namely filters and transforms. Filters do exactly that, filter out some information, much like the way polarizing lenses function. Transforms are different in that they translate or transform the data into other more useable forms. I take as my model for transforms the discussions of Chomsky and others in linguistics. This too is an area of great importance and interest but must wait for another essay.

Durkheim rejected Kant's concept of the a priori, but Kant had actually anticipated the work of the biogenetic structuralists. I agree that these structures are transcendent, i.e., they are universal in all humans. In fact we need the insights of evolutionary psychologists and anthropologists to tell us what life would have been like 100,000 plus years ago (i.e., gathering and hunting nomadic people's lives) to help us understand both the origin and nature of these structures.

There are gross gender ( and possibly less dramatic 'racial') differences in biogenetic structure which will be interesting to look at more closely but are beyond the scope of the present effort.

The innate biogenetic structures can be broken down into the following (non-mutually exclusive) categories.

1. Weak which can be overridden by new information/structures from culture (maternal urges, for example).

2. Strong which cannot be overridden because they are too deep and crucial for species survival (e.g., libidinal structures).

3. Developmentally dependent (e.g., imprinting, language acquisition). These structures will or will not exist depending upon the appropriate external stimuli on the individual. The best example here is language acquisition.

4. Constantly working as in always prioritizing sense data which comes in. The brain is taking in billions of bits of information constantly and must prioritize these data (which is why we shouldn't take LSD which acts by temporarily disrupting this mechanism in the brain.)

5. Temporary kinds of things like oxytosin release and bonding with a partner after orgasm.

The learned structures can be illustrated thusly:

Durkheim rejected Kant's concept of a priori constructions but just because he was trying to be "super sociologist" and claim that everything social needed to be explained by external social forces. He was right in asserting that some structures were learned ("internalized"), but wrong in viewing these as excluding the possibility of the innate a priori structures.

In parallel to the above discussion of "hardwired" genetically transmitted structures, below are some types of learned structures:

1.  Cultural patterns are culture specific and hence not universal. A thorough discussion of this level would include a discussion of subcultural patterns as well and also gets into the difficulty of Culture vs. culture i.e., world culture vs. nation-state.

2.  Some are "hard wired" i.e. they're part of the culture weltanschauung and we don't even realize that they are part of our perspective; they are the world-taken-for-granted, and an example would be our pan-cultural biocentric perspective.

3. Some structures are learned and very temporary (subcultural) and impose a "blinder" on the individual.

A crucial point here is that these structures are literally in the brain and are the functional equivalent of the biogenetic structures. To be emphatic, I am not talking in metaphor here--these literally become part of the architecture of the brain and have an impact on both input and output. Reification, in exactly the way Marx (and the neo-Marxists) thought of it, is a real problem. Indeed, the "ruling ideas an any age are ever the ideas of the ruling class," and these ideas do control how people think. False consciousness is real, it is internalized and crystallized ideas.

In sum, there are various brain architecture structures which direct and alter how we know what we know, i.e., the "input" and subsequent processing of sense data. More specific description and explication is demanded here, but that will wait for future research.

The "output:" how these same structures impact how we communicate with the world.

That the brain is always functioning, i.e., we are always "thinking" is a basic premise of both Freudian thought and physiological psychology. For Freud, dreams were a way for the mind to process and deal with the various experiences and traumas of life, some obvious and surface, others more repressed and subtle. For the strict Freudian (are there any left?), everything a person dreamed was significant and the task of the psychoanalyst was to uncover the metaphorical content of these dreams. The physiological psychologist will argue that at least in part that dream content is a function of somewhat random brain biochemistry. Yes, you'll get bad dreams if you eat (fill in the blank). In any case, what is happening when we think (and dream) is dominated by both the filtering and transforming functions of the innate and learned structures discussed above.

Just as Kant anticipated the biogenetic structuralists, I believe the Giambattista Vico anticipated the work of Steven J. Gould and his discussion of spandrels. Spandrel is a technical architectural term referring to the space "left over" in a design. The example that Gould uses is from his inspiration of the cathedral at San Marcos. Four arches at right angles to each other topped by a concave dome, create spandrels where the aches and dome meet. This space happens by default and not design, and hence have a serendipitous beginning. But at San Marcos, as everywhere where spandrels are created, this space is put to use by the architect and the other artists who complete the work. Vico proposed that one of the sine qua non of being human were the powers of fantasia and ingego or imagination and invention; his epistemology was non-positivistic and rejected both simplistic materialisms and even the more sophisticated idealism. He reckoned that there was something inside of the mind that was more complex and wonderful than that which is simply learned and that human "output" was truly unique and wonderful. Gould argues that spandrels are created in the brain as a natural consequence of learning and taking in more data, literally new brain architecture. i.e., structures which may have the impact of subtly filtering and/or transforming thoughts. In reference to dream analysis mentioned above, an additional explanation for some aspects of dreams may be the chance creation (and subsequent use of) spandrels in the brain.

The biogenetic and "learned" structures in the brain impact "output" in many ways. One major function of these filters and transforms is to prioritize data as it enters and is processed by the brain. We can intentionally alter the functioning of these brain structures. Right now if I suggest that you become conscious of the taste in your mouth you will do so, i.e., you will focus on that sense data as it becomes a higher priority. This is a trivial example of reprioritization which can and does occur much more than we realize as we go though our daily lives. A second example is taking LSD. The biochemistry of the brain is altered by the LSD and the prioritizing function of the brain is altered; it no longer "knows" what is important and what is not.

Let us now turn to the ideas of Georg Simmel and examine how his ideas on the functions of art can fit into the sociobiological paradigm. For Simmel there were two main functions of art. First, taking a page from Neitzsche, Simmel argued that the aesthetic is the goal of life. Art is and gives meaning to life, and all rationalists arguments for logic and reason in understanding the meaning of human life fall short; they focus on the destination and not the journey.

The second function of art is to communicate to others in such a way as to circumvent the destructive transforms of linear language and mechanical convention. Art is an externalization of the psyche in a way that the individual conveys ideas and images which are much larger than can be traditionally communicated.

Another definition of art is that is it a creative (read: spandrel driven) and playful use of the very complex and dynamic brain architecture, an architecture which includes all three: innate biogenetic structures, learned structures and spandrels. The image of brain function that I am presenting is that it is much more complex than we had previously thought and it is clearly not static. Although some filters and transforms are "permanent," others are more transitory and both can be part of the creation of spandrels at any moment.

Why do we enjoy art? What is beauty? Why is music such a compelling cultural universal? Why is the aesthetic the goal of life? The answers to all of these questions, and to the above implied questions as to the origin, nature and functioning of all the biogenetic structures, may just come from an application of evolutionary theory.

Beauty is that which is healthy, and that which is healthy (if food) won't make us sick and die or (if human) will he/she be a likely successful partner in passing on our genes to the next generation. An appreciation of beauty is not a high order cognitive function; it could not be more basic and crucial for individual and species survival. But what of music? Two answers here, the first the same as the explanation for an appreciation of beauty. Aural input is as relevant as visual input as far as the brain is concerned in this aspect. The second answer comes from the absolute necessity in survival for the discernment of patterns. Seeking out and recognizing patterns makes us much more viable both as individuals and as a species. This lust for patterns translates into an appreciation for both the production and consumption of music. The "savage soul" is soothed by both the beauty and tonal symmetry of music. Much ethological and early human development research points to the "hardwiring" of an appreciation for (and perhaps a need for) both beauty and pattern.

G.H. Mead and biogenetic structures: back to Fromm and The Sane Society

As society gets more and more complex, so must the mind. My reading of Mead is that he says that we begin somewhat tabula rasa and become human by internalizing (albeit each of us idiosyncratically in our own way) the patterns and perspectives of the culture in which we live. If we live in a small gathering band our minds reflect that simplicity and, on the opposite end of the scale, if we live in a modern urban setting our minds mirror that complexity. The brain architecture with all the attendant spandrels and additional culturally internalized transforms and filters also gets more complex. We become more creative, more nuanced in our thought (and dreams) as our worlds get larger and we take in more data. Is it possible that some of these created structures compete with the ones which are innate? Is it possible that some of the created structures give competing commands to the brain's thought processes? Yes, of course on both counts. Further, is it possible that the present state of human cultures (as Fromm argued long ago from a slightly different standpoint) is inherently pathological? I would argue yes based on what I understand on evolutionary principles. Much further thought and research in this area needs to be pursued.

The implications of the sociobiological neo-Darwinian perspective for humanist sociology are real and important. The above discussion of the epistemological implications of this perspective is both very sketchy and highly speculative, and I am deeply humbled by the amount of reading and work I have in front of me before I gain a more complete understanding. I do believe that this "new" perspective will soon become a major paradigm in sociology much as it has in psychology, medicine, psychiatry, and other fields.